Since the spectacular announcement of the new politics of global justice in the 1990s -in Chiapas (1994), Paris (1995) and Seattle (1999) -a good deal of sociological attention has been placed on the networks, communication technologies, nongovernmental organizations, and discourses through which these politics have been constituted and the transnational political terrain on which they move (e.g.
Since the spectacular announcement of the new politics of global justice in the 1990s -in Chiapas (1994) , Paris (1995) and Seattle (1999) -a good deal of sociological attention has been placed on the networks, communication technologies, nongovernmental organizations, and discourses through which these politics have been constituted and the transnational political terrain on which they move (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Olesen, 2004; Smith, 2001 Smith, , 2002 Smith and Wiest, 2005) . In the same period, a literature has accumulated on the formation of a neoliberal transnational historic bloc, an assemblage of elite policy-planning organizations, transnational corporations, and global-governance organizations that has promoted, and to some extent consolidated, a hegemonic project of neoliberal globalization (Gill, 1995; Sklair, 2001; Carroll and Carson, 2003; Robinson, 2004; Nollert, 2005) . On the premise that these phenomena are dialectically related, this paper traces the war of position between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in the current era; a struggle in which conflicting visions of justice clash within a global field.
Globalization-from-below is diverse in its conceptions of social justice, yet its minions are agreed that injustice is rooted in contemporary social arrangements and structures that can be transformed through collective action. As globalization accentuates both human interdependencies and the awareness of those interdependencies, this "movement of movements" appears to be converging around a counter-hegemonic vision that integrates struggles against "maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation" within a dialogical framing of social justice in terms of parity of participation and the allaffected principle (Fraser, 2005, pp. 79, 82-4) . 2 Such an holistic project is not easily posited, let alone pursued, yet it gains shape and form as "activists create spaces, both physically and emotionally, that promote ideas of social justice in explicit opposition to the injustice enacted by the global institutions of neo-liberalism and global capital" (Lacey, 2005: 405) .
Globalization-from-above has trumpeted unfettered capitalism as the harbinger of individual liberty and material abundance, creating optimal consumer choice in the marketplace and a rising tide of affluence that lifts all boats. The neoliberal doctrine informing this vision locates "plain justice" in the market mechanism itself and denies that "social justice" is anything but "a dishonest insinuation that one ought to agree to a demand of some special interest which can give no real reason for it" (Hayek, 1976, p. 90) . Notwithstanding Hayek's faith in the plain justice of the marketplace, by now we are painfully familiar with the logic and consequences of neoliberalism: the policies of fiscal retrenchment that degrade social programs, the accumulation by dispossession (euphemized as privatization) and "commodification of everything" (Harvey, 2005) , the harmful impact of deregulated global market forces on workers and communities, as exchange value reasserts itself at a centre of life (Teeple, 2000) . This triumph of "plain justice" over social justice has been a global phenomenon -hence the currency of the term transnational neoliberalism. If, as Jessop (2002 113) holds, globalization is the complex and emergent product of various forces operating on many scales, in the economic field its most salient impact has been to strengthen the structural power of capital vis-à-vis agents enclosed within national states, as the circuitry of accumulation becomes more internationalized (Gill and Law, 1989) . Neoliberalism is the political paradigm that converts that structural power from a contingent and contestable accomplishment to a seemingly permanent reality, within which market-driven politics holds sway (Leys, 2001 ).
There can be little doubt that the power of neoliberal concepts "goes hand in hand with the changed orientation of an increasingly internationalised business communityindustrial TNCs [transnational corporations], big banks, financial conglomerates and other investment-related firms -or as some call it, of an 'expanding transnational managerial class'" (Bierling, 2006, p. 211) . United through the ideological practices of various international forums and policy groups which have become venues for promoting a consensus around the cosmopolitan vision of a borderless world of friction-free capitalism, this transnational bloc of social forces is more extensive than its strict class base might suggest (Bierling, 2006, p. 221) . It encompasses public officials in international and national agencies of economic management, and a great range of specialists and experts who help maintain the global economy in which the TNCs thrive -"from management consultants, to business educators, to organizational psychologists, to the electronic operators who assemble the information base for business decisions, and the lawyers who put together international business deals (Cox, 1987, p. 360; Sklair, 2001) .
As a hegemonic project, however, transnational neoliberalism poses great problems. Its basic mechanisms -market liberalization, accumulation by dispossession, densification of capital circuits -do not allow for the wide ranging material concessions that, at least in the global North, stabilized class relations during the national-Keynesian era (Carroll, 2006) . If hegemony is secured by constructing and maintaining a historic bloc whose constituent elements find their own interests and aspirations reflected in a shared project, neoliberalism's bloc is thin, and made incrementally thinner by widening economic disparities world-wide and within national societies. The pervasive social injustices attendant upon neoliberal policy have been well documented by Bourdieu and Accardo (1999) and Chossudovsky (2003) , among others. In turn, they are accompanied by looming ecological issues, which neoliberalism seems incapable of seriously addressing, and a worrying record of economic instability, evident particularly since the 1997-8 financial crisis. Neoliberal hegemony, to say the least, is far from secure. It is subverted not only by its own contradictions, which have inspired a movement for global justice, but by the territorial logic of states -most evidently expressed in the new UScentred imperialism (Amin, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Stokes, 2005) . It is in this context that we can understand the challenges facing neoliberalism's organic intellectuals as they advance the project in an incipiently global civil society.
Global civil society as an emergent field
Organized policy planning behind the scenes has long been "a form of the socialisation of the conduct of class struggle on the part of the bourgeoisie" ( Van der Pijl, 1998, p. 108) . Although "global civil society" entered the lexicon of social science only recently, Kees van der Pijl (1998) has traced the formation of imagined international communities for a developing cosmopolitan bourgeoisie back to the networks of Freemasons in the late 17 th century. As inter-imperialist rivalry and revolution tore apart that transnational brotherhood in the late nineteenth century, the Rhodes-Milner Round Table Group emerged as a British Empire-centred network of elite planning, to be joined in 1919 by the International Chamber of Commerce. Since the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, but especially since the corporate offensive of the 1970s, strategized in the Trilateral Commission's report on The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier et al, 1975) , neoliberal policy-planning groups have played a signal role in building, consolidating and bolstering this bloc, along with its norm of plain justice. They have conducted a war of position to shift "the balance of cultural and social forces" (Femia, 1981, p. 53) , and thereby to win new political space in a global field.
If initially the bourgeoisie held sway in global civil society, from the late 19 th century onward international labour organizations and left party organizations entered the field. Since the 1990s, a wide range of subaltern groups opposed to neoliberal capitalism has begun to mount a concerted struggle for position, constituting a potentially counterhegemonic bloc of aligned social forces. Certainly, the thousands of international NGOs that now have "consultative status" with the United Nations's Economic and Social 
Studies in

39
Council confirm the arrival of global civil society, and indeed of a global civil societystate complex. Civil society, however, is not a unified "agent" (Olesen, 2005) , nor is it a collection of politically progressive groups (as implied in Lipschutz, 1996) , but a field within which interests and identities take shape vis-à-vis each other (Urry, 1981) ; and, at that, it is hardly a level playing field (Swift, 1999) . From the neo-Gramscian perspective taken here, global civil society appears as the terrain for both legitimizing and challenging global governance. ... further, global civil society is not just a sphere of activity, but a discursive space, which helps to reproduce global hegemony. ... [S] ocial movements must recognize they are positioned within this hegemonic constellation, and … that there are structural and discursive forces at play, of which the very framework of global civil society is itself a part, and which social movements themselves may actually be actively reproducing, rather than challenging (Ford, 2003, p. 129) .
Global civil society is, in short, profoundly tilted to the right by the dominance of capital in national politics, in international relations, in global governance and in mass communications. In these circumstances, movements for global justice face an ongoing challenge to find openings that do not lead into co-optative capture while building constituencies at the grassroots. But neoliberal groups, in spite of their greater resources and central locations within the ruling historic bloc, also face the challenge, mentioned earlier, of legitimating their practices and positions in a crisis-ridden era in which social injustices sharpen while the margin for dispensing concessions narrows.
Finally, it is helpful to understand global civil society as a multiorganizational field (Klandermans, 1992) wherein diverse groups championing (or challenging) globalization, from above or below, take up specific niches in an organizational ecology that is itself substantially networked (Carroll and Shaw, 2001; Fisher et al, 2005) . Global civil society comprises not only a terrain of struggle, not only a discursive space, but also a rich variety of organizations, with distinctive structures, projects and interrelationships, addressing transnational publics -whether privileged or subaltern (Olesen, 2005) . In examining some of these organizations, below, we open one window on the struggle for social justice in a global field.
Paired comparisons
My focus here is on four key groups on each side of the complex relation between dominant class and subalterns. Groups struggling within global civil society are diverse in their organizational structures, constituencies and modi operandi, making the task of comparative analysis quite complicated. To facilitate the process, I will use a method of paired comparison across four aspects of the struggle for hegemony: 1) the relation between capitalism's "fundamental classes" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 5) , 2) the exercise of intellectual/ideological leadership, 3) the ecological question, and 4) construction of public spheres for forming consensus. For each aspect, a key neoliberal organization is paired with its counter-hegemonic counterpart --for instance, the World Economic Forum and its antithesis, the World Social Forum. Some pairings might be arguable, and the analysis is hardly exhaustive. The point of the exercise is not to satisfy some sort of multifactorial research design but to highlight the role certain organizations have played and the niches they have taken up in global struggles for hegemony.
The four pairs of organizations are listed in Table 1 , along with sketches of core membership, organizational form and action repertoire/strategy in Table 2 . With this small, purposive sample we can glimpse some of the dynamics of hegemony and counterhegemony in a global field. Comparing year of formation alone, it is clear that groups promoting neoliberalism attained positions of early influence in the global field, expressing the material, organizational and intellectual advantages that accrue to the dominant class, with defensive responses, on a global terrain, coming later, as in Polanyi's (1944) Van der Pijl (1998) has called the Lockean heartland, progressively dissolving Hobbesian regimes committed to statist developmental logics -was trumpeted as a premise for peaceful international relations. Yet despite the US Open Door policy, after the Second World War consolidation of a corporate-liberal paradigm pushed neoliberalism to the margins. The same paradigm limited prospects for global oppositional politics. The Keynesian class compromise marked the apogee of the Westphalian political imaginary: it cleaved "domestic" from "international" political space (Fraser, 2005) , and in particular contained labour politics within national, reformist frameworks whose counter-hegemonic potential was further drained by a trade-union imperialism ideologically aligned with Cold War anti-communism (Munck, 2002, pp. 141-4) .
Despite the more recent successes of Thatcherism and Reaganism and the triumph in the 1980s of the Washington Consensus, the struggle to neoliberalize the world has been far from straightforward. In the 1990s it met with major setbacks, including recession, crises, and the emergence of new forms of civil resistance to the incursions of capitalist globalization.
International Chamber of Commerce, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
Let us proceed to the first of our paired comparisons by considering two global organizations that encompass large memberships on each side of the divide between capital and labour. The Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is the oldest global business policy group and from its inception has maintained a resolutely free-market conservative strategic vision. It is also the largest, claiming some 7,000 member companies and associations from over 130 countries. As a forum for transnational capitalist consultation, launched by investment bankers in the shadow of World War I, the ICC has functioned as the most comprehensive business forum committed to the plain justice of liberal markets. It has "long been a triumphant lobbyist for global economic deregulation in fora such as the WTO, the G8 and the OECD" (Balanyá et al, 2000, p. 166) .
As stated in its constitution (available online), the ICC's fundamental objective is "to further the development of an open world economy with the firm conviction that international commercial exchanges are conducive to both greater global prosperity and peace among nations." This basic goal implies three aims -to promote 1) international trade, investment and services, 2) a market economy based on the competitive principle, and 3) global economic growth. The aims, in turn, are met via two principle means: 1) "political advocacy and lobbying" directed at international organizations such as the WTO and UN and at national governments, and 2) "provision of a range of practical services to business," such as the International Court of Arbitration (Kelly, 2005, p. 259) .
The ICC provides a forum where capitalists and their organic intellectuals can forge a common international policy framework. Since the mid-1990s its efforts to institutionalize an agenda of corporate self-regulation have fostered close working relationships with international institutions such as the WTO and the UN General Secretariat (ibid, 166-174) . Finally, and importantly, the ICC knits national Chambers throughout the world into a single global network through its World Chambers Federation (WCF), which provides a vertical organizational link between the network of transnational capitalist interests carried by the ICC membership and the untold numbers of small-and medium-sized businesses affiliated with local and national Chambers of Commerce. It is the combination of the group's free-market vision, its institutionalization of transnational business practices, and its incorporation of local-level business into a global capitalist perspective, that gives the ICC a unique niche within the organizational ecology of transnational neoliberalism (Carroll and Carson, 2003) . The Chamber reaches deeply into regional and national contexts, and mobilizes capitalists themselves as organic intellectuals engaged in business leadership. This organizational form gives impetus to a social bloc that extends from the global to the local.
Beyond its contribution to class formation per se, the Council reaches into global political processes.
3 Although its ties to the UN weakened during the years in which a Keynesian developmentalism held sway, by the 1990s, on the other side of the Reagan/Thatcher era, the ICC "pushed to the forefront of international affairs," in the process expanding its membership and overhauling its identity, rebranding itself in 1998 as the "World Business Organization" (Kelly, 2005, p. 263) . In its recent efforts, the ICC has targeted the UN, entering in 2000 into a Global Compact for peaceful development and poverty alleviation and taking active roles within a host of UN agencies (Kelly, 2005, pp. 267-9) -all with the effect of securing legitimacy as an organization of both global governance and global business.
If the ICC has become the "World Business Organization," perhaps what is most striking is the lack of any counter-hegemonic labour organization that could credibly make a parallel claim. Factionalized into social-democratic and communist centrals at the very time that the ICC emerged as a source of transnational capitalist unity, organized labour would become largely contained within national states in the middle decades of the twentieth century, striking up social accords under the aegis of the KWS or being absorbed into the party-state, and showing little interest in international organization or action -at the very time that capital, under the hegemony of the US Open Door policy, was rapidly transnationalizing. This meant that labour's initial response to the neoliberal offensive would be mounted largely within national (or sub-national) fields and would be tinged with nostalgia for restoration of the status quo.
Although the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was formed in 1949, at least until the departure of the labour-imperialist AFL-CIO in 1969, and arguably until its 1996 World Congress, which recognized the need for transnational action in response to capitalist globalization (Munck, 2002, pp. 151, 13) , it could hardly be considered a candidate for counter-hegemonic leadership of any sort. In a post-Cold War context of neoliberal ascendance, the world's largest international labour central finally took up the call for a global Keynesian regime of social and environmental rights based on international regulation (Munck, 2002, pp. 156) . The ICFTU remains bureaucratic in structure, and skewed in its leadership toward a minority of unions from industrialized countries. Still, it is the world's largest, most representative trade union body, claiming 155 million members and 236 affiliated organization in 154 countries.
Organizationally, the ICFTU is structured as a confederation of national trade union centrals. Its professional staff are tasked with organizing and directing campaigns on issues such as the respect and defence of trade union and workers' rights, eradication of forced and child labour, promotion of equal rights for working women, the environment, education programs for trade unionists worldwide, and organizing young workers. 4 One can see in this list, a basis for alliances with a wide range of contemporary social movements, and indeed, since its 2000 congress in Durban the ICFTU has been committed to building "alliances with NGOs and civil society around shared values of human rights" (Davis, 2004, p. 124 ). Yet in the same year, the ICFTU signed on to the same Global Compact as endorsed by the ICC -a purely voluntary framework that brings business, labour and environmental representatives together under the auspices of the UN (Munck, 2002, pp. 169) . The ICFTU's quest for global regulation has engendered a vicious circle -"a lack of mobilizing capacity, modest objectives, equally modest achievements, limited recognition by and relevance for rank-and-file trade unionists on the ground" (Hyman, 2005, p. 148) . The elite and grassroots "sides" of ICFTU's action repertoire are potentially complementary strategic elements in a war of position, but only if the former does more than provide an ethical cover to the TNCs and if the latter helps mobilize workers in ways that build alliances with other democratic movements. With membership from the global South (half of its total in 1999) rapidly increasing, the challenge is "to integrate the struggles and concerns of workers both North and South" (Jakobsen 2001, p. 370) , to create a "new internationalism" that moves beyond elite-level deals at the WTO within the logic of neoliberal global governance (Waterman 2005, p. 200) .
Peter Waterman (2001, p. 313) has put his finger on the biggest task: to break free of "the ideology, institutions and procedures of 'social partnership. ' [which] have become hegemonic…." The ICFTU continues to express the national, industrial, colonial capitalism that gave it initial shape and form. Two massive challenges reflect its disadvantageous position in the global field, both institutionally and culturally:
One major challenge has to do with the role of a literally international confederation in times of globalisation. The ICFTU … is at the peak of a pyramidal structure several removes … from any flesh-and-blood workers. It is also an institution heavily incorporated into a traditional world of the inter-state institutions, with much of its energy addressed to lobbying these. The second major challenge … is the virtual invisibility of the ICFTU. Here is an organisation with 155 million members and rising that has no presence at all in the global media or culture, whether dominant, popular or alternative (2001, p. 315) .
In comparison with the ICC, whose aggressive drive for market liberalization has paid political dividends to its constituency, the ICFTU has cautiously sought global accords, clauses, and protections against the ravages of the market. Whether this key organization is capable of leading, or at least actively participating in, a transition to the kind of new social unionism envisaged by Waterman 5 is a central question in the future of counter-hegemony. If, as Hyman (2005) argues, the ICFTU has served primarily a "diplomatic" function for labour within the machinery of international institutions, its counter-hegemonic prospects hinge on going beyond that carefully circumscribed role, to participate in globalization from below. ICFTU's recent involvement in the World Social Forum is a hopeful sign, to be placed alongside the major structural trend that favours a formative role for labour in any global counter-hegemonic bloc -the expanding size of the world's working class and the sharpening class contradictions associated with neoliberal accumulation.
The Mont Pèlerin Society, The Transnational Institute
The struggle for hegemony involves production and dissemination of ideas. In this, the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) has been distinctively in the vanguard of neoliberalism, serving "a more militant intellectual function than an adaptive/directive role in the background," as has been the case with elite groups like the Bilderberg Conference or the Trilateral Commission. For MPS, "the neo-liberal intervention was of a much more 'willed' than organically hegemonic nature" (Van der Pijl 1998, p. 130) . When the Society was founded in 1947, Keynesian corporate liberalism was becoming a hegemonic policy paradigm; hence the task was to create, under less than felicitous conditions, a hegemonic project that could ultimately contribute to a neoliberal counter-revolution. In his paper "The Intellectuals and Socialism" (1949) , which can be read as a founding document of MPS, Friedrich von Hayek drew two conclusions from his analysis of the influence of socialism in post-war policy and media circles. First, the right lacks such rising stars as Keynes, hence the need "to rebuild anti-socialist science and expertise in order to develop anti-socialist intellectuals" (Plehwe and Walpen, 2005, p. 33) . Second, the socialist filter in the knowledge-dissemination institutions -universities, institutes, media -has to be attacked by establishing anti-socialist knowledge centers able to filter, process, and disseminate neoliberal knowledge (Plehwe and Walpen, 2005, p. 33) . The MPS set itself directly upon the first task and indirectly upon the second, with impressive results over the long haul.
Although the Society laboured in relative obscurity for more than two decades, as the post-war hegemonic bloc dissolved it emerged as a major centre for neoliberal propaganda and informal policy advice, whether to Pinochet's Chile or Thatcher's Britain ( Van der Pijl, 1998, p. 129) . Its membership grew from an initial group of 38 to a total membership of 1025 (48 women), with almost equal numbers from the US (458) and Europe (438) and with a smattering of members in 27 non-Euro-North American states. Many members established or became active in 100 national-level right-wing think tanks, constituting a global network of neoliberal knowledge production and dissemination (Plehwe and Walpen, 2005, pp. 34-40) . By periodically assembling "scientists" (mainly economists) and "practical men" (including corporate capitalists, politicians and journalists) committed to neoliberalism's core principles of the minimal state and the rule of law, by fostering a worldwide network of neoliberal advocacy think tanks, the MPS has not only provided neoliberalism with a durable anchor point within the space of economic doctrines (Denord, 2002) . It has managed to build capacity in global civil society for neoliberal culture, securing in the process the conditions for its own continued relevance.
Perhaps the closest left analogue to the MPS is the Transnational Institute (TNI), "a worldwide fellowship of committed scholar-activists," as its website proclaims (http://www.tni.org).
6 Funded initially as a branch of the Washington DC-based Institute for Policy Studies (with which it continues to have close relations), the TNI was one of the first research institutes to be established as a global organization -transnational in name, orientation, composition and focus. Founded in Amsterdam late in 1973, just as neoliberalism was beginning to find political traction, the TNI has been a consistent critic of the new right. Its first conference, "The Lessons from Chile," attended in 1974 by about 50 people including Ralph Miliband, André Gunder Frank, Herbert Marcuse and Johan Galtung, helped build a political response to the coup that brought the first neoliberal regime to power. The conference established the TNI's presence on the European radical left, as did its first book-length publication, World Hunger, Causes and Remedies (1974) .
According to its own website account, the TNI's mission is to provide "intellectual support to those movements concerned to steer the world in a democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable direction." The Institute has assembled an international network of hundreds of scholar-activists which is strategically mobilized to locate the most appropriate people to design and participate in study groups, international conferences, and the production and dissemination of working and policy papers and accessible books, often translated into several languages. At the centre of the network are the Amsterdam-based staff and a couple dozen Fellows, appointed to three-year renewable terms. They include journalists, independent researchers, and senior scholars from similar institutes in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the US. The fellows meet annually in Amsterdam, in a small-scale answer to MPS's annual retreat. But many of them are also actively engaged in specific TNI programs and projects, summarized in Table 3 , where we see a wide-ranging yet coherent framework for counter-hegemony, organized along the themes of new politics, global economic justice (including extensive ecological elements), peace and security, and shadow economies. The knowledge that TNI produces is both critical of dominant institutions and proactively oriented to creating or strengthening democratic alternatives, as in New Politics's emphasis on participatory governance. Despite its meager resources (a budget of US$ 1.1 million in 2003 and a staff of 10), the TNI engages in a multi-frontal war of position and gains energy from active collaboration with other NGOs, institutes and movements throughout the world.
7 One TNI initiative worth highlighting is the "Social Forum Process" that falls under the rubric of New Politics. An active participant in the WSF and the European Social Forum (ESF), the TNI has reflected critically on the process in play at these events -the innovative developments and the nagging problems. At the designated web page one can find varied analyses by TNI Fellows. 8 At a certain level of abstraction, and despite vast differences in scale, the MPS and TNI are kindred organizations. Both engage proactively in knowledge production and dissemination to inform effective political practice; both have strategically built global networks and have collaborated with like-minded groups. But while the MPS's hegemonic project places the market at the centre of human affairs, the TNI arises both as th World Social Forum. The new methodology was based on "dissolving a centrally decided programme and involving participating organisations fully in setting the framework of the Forum's activities," bringing the WSF's organization to social-movement aspirations to join autonomy with horizontal connectedness while also testing "the potentiality of the new technologies to facilitate popular participation, share knowledge and develop dense networks of resistance and alternatives" (Wainwright, 2005) . As a representative of both the TNI and the ESF at the 2004 WSF, Wainwright was tasked with evaluating the new methodology, with an eye toward its possible adoption by the ESF. Her detailed report, based on participant observation and extensive interviews with WSF participants, exemplifies the reflexive approach to praxis that characterizes the work of the TNI, especially in its New Politics programme. a critic of neoliberalism and an advocate for participatory democracy, social justice and ecology. The knowledge they create circulates, in the former case, among right-wing think tanks, academics, politicians and journalists mainly in the US and Europe, and in the latter case, among left-wing think tanks and NGOs, scholar-activists, social movements and alternative media, often in the global South. Concretely, the two projects are embedded in opposing historic blocs, as each group develops and deploys knowledge with the strategic intent to make its bloc more coherent and effective. This entails quite different practices: the MPS, firmly committed to hierarchy as a principle of social and political organization, fits easily into existing elite structures: its messages need carry no further than a relatively small circle. The TNI, on the other hand, as a collective intellectual of the left, faces the challenge of reaching a massive, diverse potential constituency and creating new political methodologies that go against the grain in giving shape to emergent oppositional practices.
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Friends of the Earth International
If on economic matters the global oppositional groups have been cast as respondents to neoliberal initiatives, the reverse is the case on the ecological question. Capital is largely inured to ecological degradation (Kovel, 2002) , at least until it registers in value terms as threats to profits. The ecological movement that was inspired in the 1960s by critical texts such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring met largely with corporate stonewalling until the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Yet already in the 1970s, ecological groups like Friends of the Earth International and Greenpeace International were organizing and acting globally, and developing wide-ranging critiques of the devastation of nature by industrial civilization, even if they lacked a critique of capital. On ecology, the transnational capitalist class fought a rear-guard battle until its intellectuals developed an eco-capitalist response, to win back lost legitimacy.
On its information-rich website (http://www.foei.org), Amsterdam-based Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) describes itself as "the world's largest grassroots environmental network," challenging the current model of corporate globalization and promoting solutions that will help to create environmentally sustainable and socially just societies. Our decentralized and democratic structure allows all member groups to participate in decision-making. We strive for gender equity in all of our campaigns and structures. Our international positions are informed and strengthened by our work with communities, and our alliances with indigenous peoples, farmers' movements, trade unions, human rights groups and others.
In this framing we can see a project that transcends 1970s environmentalism. The description highlights the organization's global scope, the close connection it draws between ecological and social issues, the direct challenge it mounts to capitalist globalization and its commitment to participatory democracy, gender equity and building 47 alliances through grassroots organizing. FoEI's global social ecology has evolved from a project limited to specific concerns over whaling and nuclear power. The group's membership was at first entirely Euro-North American; only in the 1980s did its Southern membership expand. FoEI's global profile received a boost at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, "where a vocal mosaic of FoE groups critiqued the business-as-usual approach of governments and corporations attending the meeting."
9 Two years later, the AGM adopted an explicit 'agenda', which has been developed further in the form of the Sustainable Societies Programme, whose basic principles combine ecology with radical democracy:
Our vision is of a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies living in harmony with nature. We envision a society of interdependent people living in dignity, wholeness and fulfilment in which equity and human and peoples' rights are realized. This will be a society built upon peoples' sovereignty and participation. It will be founded on social, economic, gender and environmental justice and free from all forms of domination and exploitation, such as neoliberalism, corporate globalization, neo-colonialism and militarism.
Structurally, FoEI is highly decentralized. It is composed of autonomous organizations that must agree to open, democratic and non-sexist practices, to the pursuit of environmental issues in their social and political context, and to campaigning, educating and researching while cooperating with other movement organizations. The International serves to coordinate collective action globally, within the framework provided by six designated campaigns: climate change, corporates, genetic modification, forests, public finance, and trade. What is noteworthy in this list, and in the sketches of each campaign's priorities in Table 4 , is the extent to which FoEI organizes its praxis in conscious opposition to neoliberalism and global capitalist domination. Even in matters such as climate change, where a technicist discourse might easily prevail, the group frames its politics in opposition to powerful corporate interests and institutions such as the WTO and WEF. Not surprisingly, the group has participated actively in the World Social Forum, hosting sessions in 2005 on four of its campaign themes and participating with other NGOs in projects on forests and on the commodification of nature. The impressive global linkages that FoEI has forged since the 1980s and its social-ecological vision make it an important agency of counter-hegemony within global civil society.
If the 1992 UN Earth Summit helped catapult FoEI onto the global scene, it also catalyzed the global business elite to enter the debate. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), formed in 1995 as a merger of two Europe-based business councils, instantly became the pre-eminent corporate voice on the environment. Currently the membership is 180 corporations as represented by their CEOs, with members drawn from more than 35 countries. Not surprisingly, membership is heavily skewed toward the developed capitalist core.
10 Council members co-chair WBCSD working groups, act as advocates for the WBCSD's policy positions, and oversee adoption of sustainable management practices within their own companies. These topflight global capitalists are complemented by a regional network of 54 BCSDs -an informal confederation of organizations that, following the ICC model, reach into civil societies to promote green capitalism in their respective countries or regions. Finally, and as a measure of the degree of its commitment to broadening the eco-capitalist bloc, the WBCSD has developed what its website describes as "strong relationships" with 47 partners (see Table 5 ). These include international and intergovernmental organizations, eco-capitalist news and information organizations, foundations, business organizations (notably, the ICC and WEF), and NGOs (equally notably, World Wildlife Fund International and Earthwatch Institute). Apart from its successful cooptation of WWFI into the cause of green capitalism, the list of partners is remarkable for its location in the Euro-North Amercan North: only two of the 47 groups are based outside of the Triad, and only one partner is based in Japan.
As Colin Carson and I have noted elsewhere (2003), the WBCSD reflects a maturing elite awareness that transnational corporate enterprise must be coupled with consensus over environmental regulation. What makes the WBCSD unique in the global policy field are its efforts to surpass the prevailing dualism of "business versus the environment." It presents a comprehensive vision of capitalist social and moral progress -anchored by its central axiom of "eco-efficiency."
11 Within this retooled version of sustainable development, business, governments and environmental activists make concessions around a general interest in sustaining both the health of nature and the "health" of the global economy. In this way, Gramsci's (1977) formula for ruling class hegemony -that concessions granted in organizing consent must not touch the essential nucleus of economic relations -is satisfied.
As one might expect, WBCSD serves as a forum for its member corporations, whose CEOs meet annually, and carries out an elite lobbying function vis-à-vis institutions of global governance. But it directs much of its energy at educating its business constituency to adopt eco-efficient practices, a program of moral reform that aims to preempt coercive state regulation. Its 225-page learning module on eco-efficiency, launched in 2005, 12 is exemplary. It introduces the concept of eco-efficiency through an elaborate series of exercises. By working through dilemmas and case exercises, learners deepen their understanding and skills; in an "Implementing" section they are taught how to appraise current performance and how to incorporate eco-efficient decisions into their business. As a hegemonic trope, eco-efficiency intends to reach well beyond the top tier of management, into "the hearts and minds of employees. Demonstrating the value of an based in Australia/New Zealand. The rest of the world contributed a total of 38 corporate members, with three based in Africa, 14 in Asia (five of them in South Korea and three in China), 10 based in Latin America (three in Mexico and three in Brazil) and 11 on the European semi-periphery (five based in Portugal and three in Russia). 11 "Eco-efficiency is achieved by the delivery of competitively priced goods and services that satisfy human needs and bring quality of life, while progressively reducing ecological impacts and resource intensity throughout the life-cycle to a level at least in line with the Earth's estimated carrying capacity." In short, it is concerned with creating more value with less impact." See the WBCSD co-efficiency module at http://www.wbcsd.ch/plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MTgwMjc . 12 Available at http://www.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/ZJUk9v12u48UXLWW5mZd/eco-efficiency-module.pdf. eco-efficient approach will help employees recognize why it is important to implement and motivate towards action [sic]" (WBCSD, 2005, pp. 5) The discourses and strategies of the WBCSD advance a global self-regulatory perspective, emphasizing benchmarking and "best practices" as voluntary means toward green capitalism. Its reflexive discursive and organizational frameworks draw realms liberal economists call 'externalities' -from employee relations to the health and safety of consumers -into an inclusive regulatory regime. The practices and discourses of corporate environmentalism, now employed by a range of TNCs, are vital in this regard, and have in their own right contributed to a persuasive globalizing capitalist ideology (Sklair, 2001) . What the WBCSD furnishes is a reflexive orchestration of these corporate initiatives into a class-wide hegemonic project.
World Economic Forum, World Social Forum
Founded in 1971 to mark the 25 th anniversary of the Centre d'Etudes Industrielles, a Geneva-based business school associated with Europe's post-war managerial revolution, The World Economic Forum (WEF) convened Europe's CEOs to an informal gathering in Davos, Switzerland to discuss European strategy in an international marketplace. Although the first meeting of 'World Economic Leaders' took place in 1982, on the occasion of the Annual Meeting in Davos, it was not until 1987 that the Forum changed its name to World Economic Forum. Its inception as a truly global collective actor may be dated from that year. In the subsequent decade the number of participants grew from less than a thousand to over three thousand, about half of whom are invited as guests of the core membership. The guests -political leaders and officials, journalists, executive officers of research foundations and academic Forum Fellows -animate many of the panels and provide the Forum with reach into civil society and a strong media profile (Graz, 2003, pp. 330) .
Like the WBCSD, the WEF is organized around a highly elite core of transnational capitalists (the 'Foundation Membership') -which it currently limits to '1,000 of the foremost global enterprises.' Like the ICC, the WEF actively extends its geopolitical reach and influence. It has done so primarily through yearly meetings apart from Davos and beyond the Triad, with meetings in Turkey, China, India, etc., and recently established a distinct operating body called the Centre for Regional Strategies (CRS) to "advance regional development and cooperation in the global economy." Indeed, in recent years the WEF has sought to "shift away from an event-oriented organisation towards a knowledge -and process-driven organization," as founder Klaus Schwab has remarked (quoted in Graz, 2003, p. 334) . In the months between the yearly extravaganza at Davos, its members and 'constituents' populate a hodgepodge of policy work groups and forums, including the InterAcademy Council, the Business Consultative Group and the Global Leaders of Tomorrow (Graz, 2003, p. 334) .
The move to a more outcome-oriented institutionalization has coincided with a broadening of ideological discourse. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Forum promoted a free-market conservative agenda, closely aligned with the Washington Consensus, but by the mid-1990s persistent capitalist crises obliged it to adopt a more regulatory tack (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 134 If the WEF can be described as "the most comprehensive transnational planning body operative today, … a true International of capital" (van der Pijl, 1998, pp. 132, 133) , it nevertheless faces major challenges in the form of responses from below that highlight a structural limitation of the elite club as a collective agent of global hegemony. Such organizations "rely on a total cleavage between those sufficiently powerful to interact behind closed doors and those having no place in such exclusive arenas. The mobilization of creative forces takes place in a confined space cut off from the public sphere" (Graz, 2003, p. 326) . While exclusionary practices intensify elite unity, and even create a powerful social myth of capitalist consciousness, the retreat from the public sphere puts the WEF and other elite organizations at a strategic disadvantage. "Divorced from society at large … paradoxically their influence emphasizes their lack of legitimacy and therefore their inability to compete in the public debate. Sooner or later this situation will foster the development of contending forces disputing their very existence" (Graz, 2003, p. 337) .
Enter the World Social Forum, a counter-hegemonic "open space" that was first convened in January 2001, as the progressive-democratic antithesis to the WEF (Teivainen, 2004, p. 123) . Although both groups may be seen as sites for wide-ranging discussion on issues of globalization, its promise and its discontents, the contrast between the WSF and global elite institutions like the WEF is acute:
While meetings at the World Economic Forum, UN, WTO and other global institutions are often closed and maintain top-down hierarchies, the WSF promotes a transparent organizing structure for its events. All workshops, seminars, round tables, panel discussions and testimonials are openly posted and participants are free to attend whichever event they want. There is no special entrance for different delegates, no excessive scrutiny as one enters a certain venue. (Byrd, 2005, p. 156) Although European activists were engaged from the planning phase forward, the WSF has local roots in the labour and other progressive movements of Brazil, and particularly Porto Alegre, whose municipal and state governments allocated substantial human and material resources to launch the Forum. After 2004 the Forum moved to a decentralized, radically democratic mode of organizing its annual meeting, with participating organizations setting the agenda. In this and other respects, the WSF is "a new kind of political space created by and helping to consolidate a transnational subaltern counterpublic" (Conway, 2004, p. 376 ) that in its diversity contains multiple public spheres. In contrast to the world-wide protest symbolized by 1968, which entailed parallel movements, each bounded by national borders, the protest against neoliberalism that is at the core of the WSF is organized globally (Waterman, 2004, pp. 60-1) .
A dilemma built into the Forum process is that between its mission as "an open meeting place" (stated as the first clause in its Charter of Principles) and the aspiration of many activists to transform it into a global social justice movement. In the former conception, the WSF's "open, free, horizontal structures" enable a process of prefiguration, bringing into being new forms of participatory democracy that incubate movements. To instrumentalize the Forum would be to sacrifice prefigurative potential for tactical gains in the immediate conjuncture (Whitaker, 2004, pp. 112-3) . Yet the absence of a "Final Document" at the conclusion of each Forum has led to criticisms that the WSF is little more than "one huge talking shop" (Keraghel and Sen, 2004, p. 487) . At the close of the 2005 Forum, 19 high-profile thinkers, including Tariq Ali, Samir Amin, Walden Bello and Immanuel Wallerstein, issued a 12-point "Consensus Manifesto" that would pull the WSF in the direction of a meta-movement -foregrounding the ends to which the Forum should direct its energy and the (state-centred) means for reaching them (see Table 6 ). In June 2006 the Forum took a step closer to an action orientation when it invited participating groups to indicate "the actions, campaigns and struggles" in which each is engaged, as a basis for the 7 th Forum, held in Nairobi in January 2007. 13 This shift, from organizing the Forum around themes for discussion to organizing it around actions and their interconnections, is of great potential importance. Whether the WSF can constitute itself as a hybrid of actor and arena, without devolving to either a tool for conventional political mobilization or a talking shop, remains unclear.
Notwithstanding this issue and emerging concerns as to whether the Forum is becoming neither arena nor actor but logo and world franchise (Sen, 2004, p. 223; Huish, 2006) , it is fair to say that the WSF comprises a signal development in global justice politics. It has struck directly at the level of meaning, countering the central premise of neoliberal hegemony since Thatcher -that "there is no alternative" (Sen, 2004, p. 213) with "there are many alternatives" (De Angelis, 2004) . This claim "opens up a problematic of empowerment and defetishization of social relations, the two basic 'ingredients' for the constitution of a social force that moves beyond capital." The WSF is indeed a site for prefiguration, for welding the present to alternative futures. As De Angelis surmises, it is open to "alternative ways of doing and articulating social cooperation, at whatever scale of social action"; and thus serves "to recompose politically the many diverse struggles for commons that are already occurring" -suggesting alternative, de-commodified ways to fulfill social needs (2004, pp. 602-3) .
The WSF's ongoing war of position within transnational civil society complements and extends the episodic wars of manoeuvre that have disrupted the summits of the WEF, WTO, G8 etc. The WSF and its regional and local offshoots "offer the liberal antiglobalisation and radical anti-capitalist movement a summit of their own, able to devise alternative strategies of globalization, … to make 'another world possible" (Farrer, 2004, p. 169) . In nurturing the convergence of movements, the WSF produces "unprecedented coordinated action on a global scale" while embracing diversity -a paradoxical deepening of democracy (Conway, 2004, p. 379) .
As a springboard into an alternative discursive and organizational space, the WSF embodies the "distinguishing mark" of the global justice movement: the commitment "to build solidarity out of respect for diversity" (Patel and McMichael, 2004, p. 250) . One can see in the six thematic axes for the 2006 World Social Forum in Caracas (Table 7 ) a rich social vision that includes within its ambit the aspirations of a great range of contemporary movements. At Caracas these themes were addressed in conjunction with two "transversal axes" -gender and diversities -that introduced an intersectional analysis of power and empowerment into the discussion. Still, the WSF faces great challenges in maintaining and enlarging the space it has opened. If, as Graz (2003) claims, the WEF's growth has subverted its founding myth that the world's elite can be brought into one place for content-rich networking, the WSF's phenomenal growth may subvert its promise of open dialogue, if most participants become relegated to the role of spectators (Huish, 2006, p. 4) .
Conclusions
Our paired comparisons allow a few guarded inferences about the dynamics of hegemony and counter-hegemony in a global field, and their implications for social justice. On both sides, groups have become more institutionalized, complex and networked. The MPS, WBCSD, WEF and WSF have moved from the simple and non-cumulative practice of holding periodic meetings to more continuous and cumulative knowledge production, campaigns and outreach; the ICC, ICFTU, TNI and FoEI have extended their organizing activities to broader constituencies -reflecting a process of historic bloc formation. Within each historic bloc, groups take up complementary niches in an organizational ecology. The intellectual/ideological leadership that the MPS has exercised, for instance, is distinct from the contributions of the ICC, the WBCSD and WEF. It is their combination -ramifying through the multiplex networks of media, academe, business and states -that advances neoliberalism globally. Of course, there is much more to a transnational bloc than a few peak civil-society organizations. We have only glimpsed the "tip of the iceberg"; indeed, a crucial component of the various groups' praxis is in the connections they foster with national and local organizations.
Moreover, although reference was made earlier to "global governance," this study has not directly considered the panoply of transnational quasi-state apparatuses (e.g., World Bank), most of which articulate with, or form part of, neoliberalism's historic bloc (Cammack, 2003) . National states also matter, not only as complexes whose relations to transnational bodies and treaties can encourage citizens' participation in global politics (Smith and Wiest, 2005) , but as crucial agents in those politics. The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a transnational extension of the Venezuela-based Bolivarian project, presents a state-centred aspect of historic-bloc formation no less important than the activities of the groups examined here. ALBA poses a radical alternative to "free trade," raising "the possibility and hope of development driven by the needs of the poor and the marginalized" (Kellogg, 2006, p. 2) . From origins in a Venezuela-Cuba mutual-aid arrangement, ALBA has expanded to include Bolivia as a partner as of April, 2006 (Kellogg, 2006 . Our analysis has focused on global civil society, but agreements like ALBA and its hegemonic counterparts, the FTAA and WTO (Hatt and Hatt, 2007) , are integral to the formation of transnational historic blocs. Intriguing comparisons await further investigation.
In the conduct of a global war of position, the dominant class and its allies have several obvious advantages, which translate themselves into effective and distinct forms of organization. Neoliberal civil-society groups are resource-rich, and they form on the sturdy basis of a transnational business elite -an organized minority that is already Their action repertoire -a combination of producing and disseminating knowledge via elite channels and corporate media, lobbying key institutions such as the UN and facilitating consensus formation among global and national elites -reflects this advantaged location. Understandably, dominant forces organized themselves in the global field early. The story of globalization-from-above recounts their successful construction of a transnational historic bloc, including civilsociety groups as well as TNCs and institutions of global governance, around a vision of plain justice and possessive individualism (Neufeld, 2001) . However, this historic bloc does not reach very deeply into the social infrastructure; for the most part it is restricted to the higher circles of the organized minority that is its real constituency: a North Atlantic ruling class. Its lack of reach into the global South, as revealed by our paired comparisons, is striking.
For groups promoting global justice the situation is exactly reversed. Constituencies are dispersed across many sites and networks, and issues of translation -from language to language, from culture to culture, from local to global -are central (Santos, 2005) . Groups have scant resources and are generally positioned on the margins of political and cultural life, although the information revolution has opened opportunities for low-cost communications across distant places, and for the production of alternative media that now form a key component of global counter-hegemony (Hackett and Carroll, 2006) . The action repertoire of these groups is unavoidably skewed toward mobilization at the grassroots through dialogue within and across counter-publics, consciousness-raising and building capacity to act collectively -using volunteer labour as the prime resource. Conjunctural wars of manoeuvre, such as the 1999 Battle in Seattle, are only feasible on this organizational and cultural basis. The labour intensivity of counter-hegemony is rooted in a basic difference between capital and its other:
… the atomized form of living labor that stands in conflict with the integrated, or liquid, form of "dead" labor causes a power relationship; the capital ("dead" labor) of each firm is always united from the beginning, whereas living labor is atomized and divided by competition (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980, p. 74) .
If this microeconomic reality underlies the structural power of international financial markets, TNCs and institutions such as the IMF, it also explains the resource richness of groups like the ICC and WEF. Subalterns can only compensate for the dominant bloc's inherent advantage in the control of vast pools of dead labour by building associations of living activists, armed with a willingness to act. Given the power differential, globalization-from-below occurs in response to the social and ecological dislocations and crises that follow in neoliberal capitalism's train. However, the bloc that is forming, as indicated by our four groups -all of which participate in the Social Forum processpenetrates much more extensively into humanity's manifold lifeworlds, and increasingly includes the global South as a majority force.
Finally, from our paired comparisons we can distinguish between a logic of replication and a logic of prefiguration. The deeply structured relations that ground 54 neoliberal hegemony -the market, the capital-labour relation, the liberal state -are already regnant in the global formation. The neoliberal project is primarily to rework, to repackage and to reform, to validate, to demonstrate global capitalism's continuing viability, to deflect calls for social justice by insisting on the plain justice of the market, to suggest pragmatic solutions that add up to a passive revolution -as in the WBCSD's notion of eco-efficiency. The groups comprising the neoliberal bloc follow a logic of replication. For counter-hegemonic groups, the social relations that might sustain an alternative way of life are immanent, emergent, or need to be invented. As history shows, this is no mean feat. Although abstract principles such as parity of participation or cosmopolitanism 14 can provide theoretical guideposts, the challenge is an eminently practical one. The prospects for social justice in a global field hinge significantly on discovering political methodologies that activate democratic social learning as to how we might live differently, as in FoEI's social-ecological vision of a peaceful and sustainable world of "interdependent people living in dignity, wholeness and fulfilment." This involves a logic of prefiguration. a joint project of TNI and the IPS, set up in 1996 as a loose network whose aim is to shift Global Energy Policy away from non-renewable energy sources towards policies promoting renewable energy (ie. wind, solar) and priorizing the energy needs of the world's 2 billion rural poor people. Alternative Regionalisms a consortium of activist research organizations rooted in social movements struggling against the effects of neo-liberal globalization in their regions Asia-Europe Relations: A People's Agenda with partner organizations in Asia, aims to provide critical analyses of significant developments in Asia, including the impact of EU policy on the region, to strengthen people-to-people solidarity between Europe and Asia and to develop joint advocacy strategies on issues of common concern to constituencies in both regions. Towards Water Justice highlights the role of European transnational corporations in the water privatization experiences of the South and showcases alternative water management models. Peace & Security challenges conventional militaristic and nuclear approaches to security with broader conceptions that encompass civilian rather than solely state or geo-political notions of security. Failed States studies failed or failing states in the context of the post-Cold War shift in global relations; challenges the idea that failed states can be technically rehabilitated without a reshaping of the international system of governance itself.
Program Project Description Globalisation & Militarisation
This pilot project aims to map and further explore the linkages between globalization and war, between neo-liberal economics and the escalation of armed conflicts around the world, between failed economics and 'failed states'. Shadow Economies looks at the underbelly of globalization: on the one hand, the illicit survival economies of many parts of the marginalized South and, on the other, the ways in which organized crime profits both from neoliberal globalization. 2) Apply international taxes/rates to financial transactions, to direct foreign investment, to consolidated profits of transnational corporations, to the sale of arms, and to activities that emit gases that contribute to global warming.
3) Progressively dismantle all kinds of fiscal, legal and banking havens. 4) Ensure that each person has a right to work, to receive social security and to retire, respecting the equality between men and women. 5) Promote all forms of commercial justice by rejecting the World Trade Organization free-trade regulations, and by implementing mechanisms that permit the processes of production that bring goods and services more progressively to a new level of social norms. The convention on cultural diversity that is being negotiated in UNESCO should explicitly claim the right of culture over the right of commerce. 6) Guarantee the right of each country to nutritional sovereignty and security by promoting rural agriculture. This assumes complete suppression of the subsidies on the exportation of farm products by the North, and the possibility of taxing imports in order to stop dumping practices. Countries should have the right to prohibit genetically-altered foodstuffs.
New economic regulations that respect every person's right to life 7) Prohibit all "patents on the mind" and on living things (be they people, animals or plants), as well as the privatization of people's common goods, namely water. 8) Above all, fight for different public policies against all kinds of discrimination, sexism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism; fully recognize the political, cultural and economic (including the regulation of natural resources) rights of indigenous communities. 9) Take urgent measures to put an end to the destruction of the environment and to the threat of serious climate change, exacerbated by the excessive use of individual transportation and non-renewable energy. Begin to instate another model of development rooted in energy conservation and the democratic control of natural resources.
A just and peaceful life for all of humanity 10) Demand the dismantling of foreign military bases and the expulsion of their troops except those serving under an official United Nations mandate. 11) Guarantee the right to information for all citizens by means of legislation that: a) puts an end to the concentration of resources among a few exclusive communication giants; b) guarantees autonomy for journalists before shareholders; c) favors not-for-profit press outlets, particularly alternative and community-based ones. Democracy of all kinds, from local to global 12) Profoundly reform and democratize international organizations, among them the UN, insuring the upholding of human, economic, social and cultural rights in concordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This implies the incorporation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and WTO into the decision-making system of the UN. Source: http://opendemocracy.typepad.com/wsf/2005/02/previous_posts_.html
